DAO

Poo, Mu-Chou, H. A. Drake, and Lisa Raphals, eds., Old Society, New Belief: Religious Transformation of China and Rome, ca. 1st–6th Centuries

Response to Jim Behuniak

Gao, Ruiquan 高瑞泉, A General Discourse on the History of Ideas of Equality 平等觀念史論略

Behuniak, Jim, ed., Appreciating the Chinese Difference: Engaging Roger T. Ames on Methods, Issues, and Roles

Response to Edward Slingerland

Guo, Qiyong 郭齊勇, Investigations of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Thoughts 現當代新儒學思潮研究

Yuan, Cheng, Practical Intellect and Substantial Deliberation: In Seeking an Expressive Notion of Rationality

Fang, Zuyou 方祖猷, A Long Biography of H uang Zongxi 黃宗羲長傳

Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism Abstract This article proposes a new reading of the mirror analogy presented in the doctrine of Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism. Clerics, such as Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664) and his protégé Kuiji 窺基 (632–682), articulated this analogy to describe our experience of other minds. In contrast with existing interpretations of this analogy as figurative ways of expressing ideas of projecting and reproducing, I argue that this mirroring experience should be understood as revealing, whereby we perceive other minds through the second-person perspective. This mirroring experience, in its allusion to the collectivity of consciousness, yields the metaphysical explication of mutual interdependence and the prescription of norms for compassionate actions.

Spontaneity, Perspectivism, and Anti-intellectualism in the Zhuangzi Abstract Contemporary Anglophone scholarship on the Zhuangzi 莊子 tends to reject intellectualism, the view that all knowledge is propositional. Scholars usually state that Zhuangzi values practical knowledge more than propositional knowledge. This valuation, however, seems to presuppose that the Zhuangzi or its interpreters must recognize the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge. In this article, I argue that Zhuangzi sees all knowledge as practical, and if we situate him in the contemporary philosophical field we can extract several ideas from the text in arguing against the postulation of propositional knowledge. First, Zhuangzi’s idea of spontaneity and forgetting defy attempts to explain our practice in terms of propositional knowledge, because spontaneous acts admit different levels and can be improved by forgetting. Second, Zhuangzi’s perspectivism implies that the relationship between our language and the world is not fixed, and there is a theoretical price to pay if intellectualists want to avoid this indeterminacy.