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Τετάρτη 7 Αυγούστου 2019

Noema and Noesis. Part II: Functions of Noematic Synthesis

Abstract

In the paper, being the second part of the work entitled Noema and Noesis, the formal model of the noematic synthesis functions is presented. Together with functions of noetic synthesis, they are understood as components of functions of intentional reference, which are to be, in turn, formalizations of intentional acts of reference performed in the stream of consciousness. Noemata are understood as mental representations associated with mental worlds. The processes of their synthesis in the mind engage the work of many noematic functions: generating predicative senses, producing noematic cores, and locating noemata in mental worlds (mental spaces). The constructed model is not intended as the faithful reconstruction of the Husserlian conception of noemata. Intuitions of the creator of phenomenology are treated as the only source of inspiration.

On the Solvability of the Mind–Body Problem

Abstract

The mind–body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment, employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemologically emergent properties may develop in a physical system. Turning to the significantly more complex neural network of the brain it is subsequently argued that consciousness is epistemologically emergent. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind–body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically emergent character of consciousness is then identified from a combinatorial analysis relating to universal limits set by quantum mechanics, implying that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena.

Model Organisms as Simulators: The Context of Cross-Species Research and Emergence

Abstract

Model organisms are a living form of scientific models. Despite the widespread use of model organisms in scientific research, the actual representational relationship between model organisms and their target species is often poorly characterized in the context of cross-species research. Many model organisms do not represent the target species adequately, let alone accurately. This is partly due to the complex and emergent life phenomena in the organism, and partly due to the fact that a model organism is always taken to represent a broad range of diverse organisms. More often than not, model organisms are taken as a reference point for an extrapolation to be made to the unknown characteristics of other species. I propose to view model organisms as analogue simulators which represent the emergent phenomenon in the context of cross-species research. A model organism represents a wide range of species by simulating their molecular microstates which underlie various emergent phenomena. I show that although model organisms represent the target species inadequately at many levels of complexity, they have epistemic values as a simulator in virtue of which the emergent phenomenon can be modeled dynamically, a virtue that is hardly attainable by non-dynamic models.

On Material Exclusion and Absolute Contradiction

Abstract

Francesco Berto has argued that a primitive concept of material exclusion could be employed to formulate a notion of absolute contradiction that not even dialetheists could accept. The machinery of material exclusion and absolute contradiction could then be employed as a common (non-question-begging) ground by both dialetheists as well as their opponents in debates about negation and truth. In this paper, we first put the idea on a clear basis, and then present some criticism to it. We shall argue that the concepts of material exclusion and absolute contradiction hardly help with a clear basis for the debate on dialetheism; furthermore, the introduction of material exclusion threatens the coherence of dialetheism by allowing one to express the opposition between designated and undesignated values, with unwanted conclusions.

Monism and Particularism: Methodology in Brentano’s Psychology

Abstract

The paper argues that Brentano was the exponent of a methodological monism, which is based on the requirement that science should be grounded on experience, and not on a speculative-idealistic principle, as in the case of German idealism. In Brentano’s psychological writings, this methodological requirement concretized in two different theses: (T1) The method of psychology is identical with the method of natural science; (T2) The method of psychology is inspired by the method of natural science. The thesis of this study is that an important part of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is elaborated in accordance with T1. By contrast, Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology illustrates the subsequent decision to give up this idea. In its place, the aforementioned requirement is elaborated in the spirit of a methodological particularism that recommends the scientist elaborate his methods according to the specificity of the phenomena under investigation and to the difficulties that need to be overcome when approaching them.

Safety, the Preface Paradox and Possible Worlds Semantics

Abstract

This paper contains an argument to the effect that possible worlds semantics renders semantic knowledge impossible, no matter what ontological interpretation is given to possible worlds. The essential contention made is that possible worlds semantic knowledge is unsafe and this is shown by a parallel with the preface paradox.

Risk and Values in Science: A Peircean View

Abstract

Scientific evidence and scientific values under risk and uncertainty are strictly connected from the point of view of Peirce’s pragmaticism. In addition, economy and statistics play a key role in both choosing and testing hypotheses. Hence we may show also the connection between the methodology of the economy of research and statistical frequentism, both originating from pragmaticism. The connection is drawn by the regulative principles of synechismtychism and uberty. These principles are values that have both epistemic and non-epistemic dimension. They concern both the decisions to test a hypothesis as well as inductive risk. The validity of this result stems from the values cost–benefit analysis imposes on scientific inquiry. Values associated with the economy of research are important not only in the pre-test phases of generating hypotheses but also when hypotheses are effectively tested. Peirce took these economic considerations to leave room for an interpretation of probability which is not only a frequentist and propensity-theoretic but also a conceptualist one referring to degrees of belief. We show that this leeway nonetheless agrees with the theory of the economy of scientific methods.

Rota on Mathematical Identity: Crossing Roads with Husserl and Frege

Abstract

In this paper I address G. C. Rota’s account of mathematical identity and I attempt to relate it with aspects of Frege as well as Husserl’s views on the issue. After a brief presentation of Rota’s distinction among mathematical facts and mathematical proofs, I highlight the phenomenological background of Rota’s claim that mathematical objects retain their identity through different kinds of axiomatization. In particular, I deal with Rota’s interpretation of the ontological status of mathematical objects in terms of ideality. Then I detect certain similarities among Rota’s views and Frege’s account of the constitution of arithmetical identity on the grounds of 1–1 correspondence. I point out an epistemic as well as an ontological aspect of this issue. In the sequel, I attempt to deal with the problem of “mixed identities” in mathematics stated by Benacerraf (1965) by taking in account Rota’s use of the phenomenological notion “Fundierung”.

Noema and Noesis. Part I: Functions of Noetic Synthesis

Abstract

In the paper, the formal model of the noetic synthesis functions is presented. Together with the functions of noematic synthesis, they are understood as components of functions of intentional reference, which are meant to be, in turn, formalizations of intentional acts of reference performed in the stream of consciousness. This research perspective allows us to extend the category of speech acts to the category of all intentional acts of reference. The functions of noetic synthesis are understood as composed of the function of noetic intention acting on qualia, noetic moods and noetic modes. The model allows us to explain the phenomenon of autism as having its source in disorders of the noetic synthesis functions. The constructed model is not intended as the faithful reconstruction of the Husserlian conception of noesis. Intuitions of the creator of phenomenology are treated as the only source of inspiration.

Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

In an attempt to reject Cartesian Dualism, some philosophers and scientists of the late twentieth century proposed a return to the ancient position that Descartes had opposed, i.e., Aristotle’s psychological hylomorphism, which applied to living beings the ontological thesis, according to which every substance is a compound of matter (hyle) and form (morphe). In this perspective, the soul is actual possession of the body’s capacity to perform a series of life functions. Therefore, according to Aristotle, soul and body are reciprocally interdependent aspects of the living being, so that we must consider the former as an enmattered form, and the latter as an enformed or ensouled matter. This means that, for Aristotle, all the functions of the soul, even the highest ones like thought, are essentially connected with the body, since they ultimately require sensations. This paper illustrates and supports this doctrine in detail, especially in relation to the cognitive processes of the human mind.

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