Foundations of Science,

Foundation of Quantum Mechanics: Once Again Abstract Brukner and Dakić (Quantum theory and beyond: is entanglement special? 2009. https://arxiv.org/abs/0911.0695) proposed a very simple axiom system as a foundation for quantum theory. It implies the qubit and quantum entanglement. Because this axiom system aims at the core of our understanding of nature, it must be brought to the forum of the philosophy of nature. For philosophical reasons, a completely denied champion of quantum theory, imaginarity i, is added into this axiom system. In relation to Bell’s inequality, this leads to a deeper ‘philosophical’ understanding of quantum nature based on qubits and entanglement. Both opens a way as well as one can get to the fundamental Schrödinger equation of quantum mechanics with the help of a complex valued Brownian motion.

Quarks, Hadrons, and Emergent Spacetime Abstract It is argued that important information on the emergence of space is hidden at the quark/hadron level. The arguments follow from the acceptance of the conception that space is an attribute of matter. They involve in particular the discussion of possibly relevant mass and distance scales, the generalization of the concept of mass as suggested by the phase-space-based explanation of the rishon model, and the phenomenological conclusions on the structure of excited baryons that are implied by baryon spectroscopy. A counterpart of the Eddington–Weinberg relation concerning Regge towers of hadronic resonances is noted.

Classicality First: Why Zurek’s Existential Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics Implies Copenhagen Abstract Most interpretations of Quantum Mechanics alternative to Copenhagen interpretation try to avoid the dualistic flavor of the latter. One of the basic goals of the former is to avoid the ad hoc introduction of observers and observations as an inevitable presupposition of physics. Non-Copenhagen interpretations usually trust in decoherence as a necessary mechanism to obtain a well-defined, observer-free transition from a unitary quantum description of the universe to classicality. Even though decoherence does not solve the problem of the definite outcomes, it helps to explain why we do not observe superpositions and, according to Zurek’s existential interpretation, why a specific preferred basis emerges through system–environment interactions. The aim of this paper is to show why such interpretation ends up begging the question and provides little progress in understanding the quantum-to-classical transition; the ultimate reason being that preferred bases always correlate to human observation. Benefitting from the technical discussion, some remarks will be offered in the last section regarding the role of classical observations as a necessary condition to make workable the formalism of Quantum Mechanics and scientific activity itself.

Quantum Theory Methods as a Possible Alternative for the Double-Blind Gold Standard of Evidence-Based Medicine: Outlining a New Research Program Abstract We motivate the possibility of using notions and methods derived from quantum physics, and more specifically from the research field known as ‘quantum cognition’, to optimally model different situations in the field of medicine, its decision-making processes and ensuing practices, particularly in relation to chronic and rare diseases. This also as a way to devise alternative approaches to the generally adopted double-blind gold standard.

Liberal Naturalism and Non-epistemic Values Abstract The ‘value-free ideal’ has been called into question for several reasons. It does not include “epistemic values”—viewed as characteristic of ‘good science’—and rejects the so-called ‘contextual’, ‘non-cognitive’ or ‘non-epistemic’ values—all of them personal, moral, or political values. This paper analyzes a possible complementary argument about the dubitable validity of the value-free ideal, specifically focusing on social sciences, with a two-fold strategy. First, it will consider that values are natural facts in a broad or ‘liberal naturalist’ sense and, thus, a legitimate part of those sciences. Second, the paper will not reject the value-free ideal; rather, it will construe this ideal in a special way, not casting values aside in sciences, but bringing them to the table and rationally discussing them. Today’s predominant naturalistic view has tended to ‘naturalize’ values by looking for physicalist explanations for them—a move resisted by defenders of normativism in social sciences. At the same time, a contending ‘liberal naturalist’ stream has emerged, claiming that not all natural entities can be explained by the methods and concepts of physical sciences, and favors a non-materialist naturalism which includes mind, consciousness, meaning and value as fundamental parts of nature that cannot be reduced to matter. Hence, it may be posited that non-epistemic values could be ‘naturally’ included in the field of human sciences.

Quantum Entanglement in Corpuses of Documents Abstract We show that data collected from corpuses of documents violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt version of Bell’s inequality (CHSH inequality) and therefore indicate the presence of quantum entanglement in their structure. We obtain this result by considering two concepts and their combination and coincidence operations consisting of searches of co-occurrences of exemplars of these concepts in specific corpuses of documents. Measuring the frequencies of these co-occurrences and calculating the relative frequencies as approximate probabilities entering in the CHSH inequality, we obtain manifest violations of the latter for all considered corpuses of documents. In comparing these violations with those analogously obtained in an earlier work for the same combined concepts in psychological coincidence experiments with human participants, also violating the CHSH inequality, we identify the entanglement as being carried by the meaning connection between the two considered concepts within the combination they form. We explain the stronger violation for the corpuses of documents, as compared to the violation in the psychology experiments, as being due to the superior meaning domain of the human mind and, on the other side, to the latter reaching a broader domain of meaning and being possibly also actively influenced during the experimentation. We mention some of the issues to be analyzed in future work such as the violations of the CHSH inequality being larger than the ‘Cirel’son bound’ for all of the considered corpuses of documents.

Does Newtonian Space Provide Identity to Quantum Systems? Abstract Physics is not just mathematics. This seems trivial, but poses difficult and interesting questions. In this paper we analyse a particular discrepancy between non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM) and ‘classical’ (Newtonian) space and time (NST). We also suggest, but not discuss, the case of the relativistic QM. In this work, we are more concerned with the notion of space and its mathematical representation. The mathematics entails that any two spatially separated objects are necessarily different, which implies that they are discernible (in classical logic, identity is defined by means of indiscernibility)—we say that the space is T2, or “Hausdorff”, or yet “separable”. But when enters QM, sometimes the systems need to be taken as completely indistinguishable, so that there is no way to tell which system is which, and this holds even in the case of fermions. But in the NST setting, it seems that we can always give an identity to them by means of their individuation, which seems to be contra the quantum physical situation, where individuation (isolation) does not entail identity (as we argue in this paper). Here we discuss this topic by considering a case study (that of two potentially infinite wells) and conclude that, taking into account the quantum case, that is, when physics enter the discussion, even NST cannot be used to say that the systems do have identity. This case study seems to be relevant for a more detailed discussion on the interplay between physical theories (such as quantum theory) and their underlying mathematics (and logic), in a simple way apparently never realized before.

A Constructivist View of Newton’s Mechanics Abstract In the present essay we attempt to reconstruct Newtonian mechanics under the guidance of logical principles and of a constructive approach related to the genetic epistemology of Piaget and García (Psychogenesis and the history of science, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989). Instead of addressing Newton’s equations as a set of axioms, ultimately given by the revelation of a prodigious mind, we search for the fundamental knowledge, beliefs and provisional assumptions that can produce classical mechanics. We start by developing our main tool: the no arbitrariness principle, that we present in a form that is apt for a mathematical theory as classical mechanics. Subsequently, we introduce the presence of the observer, analysing then the relation objective–subjective and seeking objectivity going across subjectivity. We take special care of establishing the precedence among all contributions to mechanics, something that can be better appreciated by considering the consequences of removing them: (a) the consequence of renouncing logic and the laws of understanding is not being able to understand the world, (b) renouncing the early elaborations of primary concepts such as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and physics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified a-posteriori (because it is convenient), (c) changing our temporary beliefs has no real cost other than effort. Finally, we exemplify the present approach by reconsidering the constancy of the velocity of light. It is shown that it is a result of Newtonian mechanics, rather than being in contradiction with it. We also indicate the hidden assumption that leads to the (apparent) contradiction.

Ignorance-Preserving Mental Models Thought Experiments as Abductive Metaphors Abstract In this paper, we aim at explaining the relevance of thought experiments (TEs) in philosophy and the history of science by describing them as particular instances of two categories of creative thinking: metaphorical reasoning and abductive cognition. As a result of this definition, we will claim that TEs hold an ignorance-preserving trait that is evidenced in both TEs inferential structure and in the process of scenario creation they presuppose. Elaborating this thesis will allow us to explain the wonder that philosophers of science have consistently shown for TEs, as well as the high functionality of TEs in the creative aspects of scientific and philosophical praxis.

…and so Euler discovered Differential Equations Abstract Euler's contributions to differential equations are so comprehensive and rigorous that any contemporary textbook on the subject can be regarded as a copy of Euler's Institutionum Calculi Integralis. Of course, Euler's work is an improvement of that of Leibniz, the Bernoullis, Newton and so many others before them, but still it's so outstanding that will be used in this paper as a reference to account for every previous or subsequent development in ODEs. Maybe Euler did not discovered differential equations, but he did not discovered less differential equations than Newton and Leibniz had discovered differential calculus a few decades before.